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ARTICLES
The Supreme Court's Second Thoughts:
Remands for Reconsideration and
Denials of Review in Cases Held
for Plenary Decisions*
By

ARTHUR

D.

HELLMAN**

Introduction
The most puzzling mode of disposition in the Supreme Court's
repertory is the summary order vacating the judgment below and remanding the case to the lower court "for further consideration in light
of" a Supreme Court decision handed down after the lower court's ruling. In the 1982 Term the Court issued sixty-nine orders of this kind;
thus, apart from cases in which review was denied altogether, only plenary opinions and appeals dismissed for want of a substantial federal

question were more numerous.' Yet the significance of this form of
disposition-known within the Court as the "GVR" 2 -remains a mys© Copyright 1984, Arthur D. Hellman.
Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A., 1963, Harvard University; LL.B.,
1966, Yale University.
The author acknowledges the research assistance of William Schenck, Class of 1984,
University of Pittsburgh School of Law. He also expresses his gratitude to LuAnn Driscoll,
who supervised the preparation of the manuscript.
1. Comprehensive data for the 1982 Term have not been published; thus, except as
otherwise noted, the figures in this Article are based on my own computations. For a statistical breakdown of the Court's dispositions in the 1975 through 1979 Terms, see Hellman,
Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court'sExercise ofDiscretionaryReview, 44
U. Prrr. L. REv. 795, 803-09 & Table I (1983). In some Terms, reconsideration orders have
actually outnumbered dismissals for want of a substantial federal question. See id (1976
Term).
2. The abbreviation derives from the fact that, except in cases coming to the Court on
appeal, the disposition reads, "The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is
vacated and the case is remanded to [the court below] for further consideration in light of
[the cited case]." See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Benham, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983). The full form of the
order is more elaborate. See, e.g, Baldwin v. State, 405 So. 2d 698 (Ala. 1981) (quoting
Supreme Court's mandate).
*
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tery to most of the legal profession. For example, some judges assume
that a summary reconsideration order means no more than what it
says: the lower court must reconsider its prior ruling, but is free to
reach the same result once again after the remand.3 Others think that
the GVR is a reversal in all but name.4 The Supreme Court has given
few clues to what it means by these orders, and little guidance is to be
found in the secondary literature. 5
In this Article I shall examine the nature and significance of the
summary reconsideration order.6 After briefly tracing the history of
this form of disposition and what the Court has said about it, I shall
present an analysis based on an empirical study of the reconsideration
orders issued in recent Terms, the responses of lower courts, and the
subsequent actions of the Supreme Court. That analysis, in turn, will
lead to an examination of the cases in which the Court deferred disposition pending the announcement of a plenary decision, but then denied review rather than remanding.7 Thereafter, I shall venture a few
suggestions for changes in the Court's practices that might reduce some
3. See, e.g., Sharpe v. United States, 712 F.2d 65, 65 n.1 (4th Cir. 1983) ("Had the
Supreme Court felt that a reversal was in order, it could and would have said so."), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 3531 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Sharpe v. United States, 712 F.2d at 67 (Russell, J., dissenting) ("The
Supreme Court was seeking to be gentle with us but there is ... no mistaking what they
expected us to do. The Supreme Court thought [the intervening decision] both relevant and
dispositive. .. ").
5. The most comprehensive analysis of which I am aware is contained in a student
work published more than 20 years ago, which is well before the Court began to make
extensive use of this mode of disposition. See The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L.
REv. 40, 92-99 (1961). The leading treatise on Supreme Court practice deals with the matter
in a single sentence accompanied by a brief footnote. See R. STERN & E. GRSsMArN,
SUPREME COURT PRAcTIcE 363 & n.34 (5th ed. 1978). For a more extended discussion, see
Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the JudiciaryAct of 1925: The Plenary
Docket in the 1970"s, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1709, 1720-21 (1978) (suggesting a tentative hypothesis and calling for further research). See also Hellman, supra note 1, at 836-47 (a preliminary version of this study).
6. The vast majority of the Court's reconsideration orders are based upon plenary decisions; however, occasionally the Court remands a case for reconsideration in light of an
opinion handed down without oral argument. See, e.g., Lane v. Smith, 457 U.S. 1102 (1982)
(citing Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 607 (1982)). There is no reason to distinguish between
these two kinds of orders, and in this Article I shall not do so.
From time to time, the Court vacates a judgment and remands the case to the lower
court for further consideration in light of something other than an intervening Supreme
Court decision. See, e.g., Bureau of Economic Analysis v. Long, 454 U.S. 934 (1981) (intervening legislation); Alabama v. Ritter, 454 U.S. 885 (1981) (intervening state court decision);
Dupris v. United States, 446 U.S. 980 (1980) (intervening events that may have mooted the
controversy). Dispositions such as these clearly are not on the merits and thus are excluded
from this study.
7. For sake of simplicity, cases in which the Court defers disposition pending a plenary
decision are referred to as "held" cases.
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of the ambiguities inherent in the present approach. Finally, I shall
assess the significance of the reconsideration order from the broader
perspective of the Court's functions in the American judicial system.

I. The Lessons of History
As an initial matter, one probably would not regard a summary
reconsideration order as a disposition "on the merits" in any sense.'
Clearly it does not-of itself-settle the dispute for the parties; and as

for precedential value, what guidance could anyone find in an order at
once so cryptic and so inconclusive? History, however, may suggest
another view. During the sixteen-year tenure of Chief Justice Warren,
more than one hundred cases were reversed outright on the authority of
a Supreme Court decision issued subsequent to the lower court's ruling.9 In the decade that began in 1971, only a handful of such disposi-

tions can be found.' 0 During the same period, the volume of summary
reconsideration orders increased far beyond what it had been in earlier

years. "I
The trends that began in the early 1970's have continued to the
present day. To be sure, the number of GVR cases in any one Term
has varied greatly, from a low of forty-two in 1977 to a high of ninetyfive in 1980.12 But the reason the range is so wide is that the volume
depends in part on the nature and scope of the Court's plenary deci-

sions 3 and in part on the extent to which other cases brought to the

8. See The Supreme Court,1960 Term, supranote 5, at 98-99; see also Helman, supra
note 5, at 1720.
9. See Hellman, supranote 1, at 822-24. A few of these dispositions were accompanied
by brief opinions or memoranda.
10. There were four decisions without opinions (none after the 1972 Term) and about
half a dozen with brief opinions.
11. Summary reconsideration orders were extremely rare under Chief Justice Vinson
(1946-1953) and in the first nine Terms under Chief Justice Warren; no more than a dozen
can be found in any one Term. The 1962 Term marked a turning point: there were more
than 60 such dispositions. However, nearly two-thirds of these were based on Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), or Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). In the
remaining Terms of the 1960's, the number of reconsideration orders never went above 50
and in one Term it dipped as low as 11. During the last decade, the number has frequently
exceeded 80 and has never gone below 40.
12. The total for the 1981 Term was 70. (These figures do not take account of consolidations. Cf.infra note 34.)
13. In particular, decisions that mark a clear departure from the law as it was perceived
by the lower courts will often generate large numbers of reconsideration orders. Thus, eight
cases were remanded in the wake of Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978), which overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), in relevant part and
held that municipalities and other political subdivisions could be sued under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Six cases were sent back for reconsideration in light of Bifulco v. United States, 447
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Court happen to involve issues identical or similar to those adjudicated
on the plenary docket.' 4 Even when the volume was at its lowest, there
was no resurgence of the summary reversal on the authority of an intervening decision.

Looking at these developments in isolation, one might well infer
that the Court has changed the form but not the substance of its dispositions: in the interest of comity, the lower court is invited to reverse
itself, rather than being told that the Supreme Court has already performed the deed, but the invitation is one that is not expected to be
refused. In short, the reconsideration order might be regarded as a polite form of reversal, but a reversal nevertheless.
One difficulty with this analysis is that during the 1960's the Court
issued reconsideration orders as well as reversals that relied on intervening plenary decisions. 15 Moreover, with rare exceptions, plenary
decisions that generated summary reversals did not generate reconsideration orders, and vice versa. 16 Thus, at least in the past, the Court
has not treated the two forms of disposition as functionally
equivalent-though the distinction between them appears to have been
grounded in the nature of the intervening decision rather than in the
relationship between that decision and the case targeted for summary
action.17 Be that as it may, the fact remains that the Court no longer
reverses summarily on the authority of an intervening precedent, even
U.S. 381 (1980), which rejected an interpretation of federal criminal law that had been espoused by four circuits.
14. Thus, Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979), which involved a widely litigated issue of prisoners' rights, generated nine remand
orders. More recently, six cases were remanded for reconsideration in light of Scindia
Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981), a plenary decision in which
the Court addressed the recurring question of the duty of care owed by shipowners toward
longshoremen. Six other cases that had been held pending the disposition of Scindia were
denied review. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 11.
16. For example, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), gave rise to more than 20
reconsideration orders in the 1962 Term, but no reversals. In the following Term, Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and the other reapportionment cases were followed by a series
of reversals (and a few affirmances), but no remands for reconsideration.
17. What is not at all clear is the principle or principles that underlay the distinction.
For example, one might think that Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which overruled a long-standing precedent and established a per se rule, would have generated outright
reversals of decisions that presumably relied on the prior law. On the other hand, Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), appeared to leave open the possibility that "divergences from a
strict population standard" in legislative apportionment could be justified by "legitimate
considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy," id.at 579; thus, reapportionment cases would appear to have been prime candidates for reconsideration orders.
Yet in each instance the Court followed the opposite pattern from what these hypotheses
would suggest.
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though, as will be seen, there are substantial numbers of cases in which
such action would be justified. 8 The conclusion that follows from all
this is that some of the reconsideration orders may be tantamount to
reversals, but it cannot be assumed that all of them are. History thus
gives no clear answer to the question of the precedential value of this
form of disposition.
The Court itself has given little guidance on the subject. One tantalizing clue, however, is furnished by the unusual statement that accompanied a 1955 order remanding nine criminal tax cases 9 that had
been held pending a group of plenary decisions in which the Court
addressed the "net worth" approach to proving tax evasion.20 Instead
of simply issuing an order of remand, the Court added: "We have not
considered the merits of these cases, nor have we determined their relation to our recent opinions, . . . believing that re-examination by the
Courts of Appeals is desirable even in those cases remotely involving
the principles laid down in the [plenary] decisions."'" The inference
may be drawn that in the ordinary GVR case the Court does "consider
the merits," and perhaps makes a preliminary determination that the
judgment below is inconsistent with the intervening decision. But the
quoted statement is itself ambiguous, and any significance it may have
is further reduced by the fact that it was issued at a time when reconsideration orders were still quite uncommon.
The Court's most extended discussion of the meaning of the GVR
is found in Henry y'. City of Rock Hill,22 a 1964 case that previously had
been remanded to a state court for reconsideration in light of an inter18. See infra text accompanying notes 35-40. In one curious case, the Court remanded
"for further consideration in light of' a Supreme Court decision that the lower court had
considered and distinguished. See May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Crim. App.) (noting
capital defendant's claim that jurors were improperly excused in violation of Adams v.
Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980), but holding that errors were waived by failure to object), vacated,
449 U.S. 959 (1981) (directing further consideration in light of Adams). Perhaps the
Supreme Court meant, by its remand order, to reject only the Texas court's holding on the
waiver issue. We shall never know; on remand, the Texas court found it unnecessary to
consider the Adams issue because the governor had commuted the death sentence. See May
v. State, 632 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). During the tenure of Chief Justice Warren, a case of this kind almost certainly would have been reversed outright. See Hellman,
supra note 1, at 823-24.
19. Goldbaum v. United States, 348 U.S. 905 (1955).
20. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954); Friedberg v. United States, 348 U.S.
142 (1954); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954); United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S.
160 (1954).
21. Goldbaum v. United States, 348 U.S. at 906.
22. 376 U.S. 776 (1964) (per curiam).
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vening decision.2 3 On remand, the state court held that the intervening
decision was not controlling and reaffirmed its previous ruling.2 4 Review was again sought, and again the Court disposed of the case summarily; but this time the judgment was reversed outright.2 5 The Court
explained that a case will be remanded for reconsideration in the light
of a recent decision when the Justices are "not certain that the case [is]
'26
free from all obstacles to reversal on [the] intervening precedent.
Such orders, the Court stated, do "not amount to a final determination
on the merits"; but they do "indicate that we [find the intervening precedent] sufficiently analogous and, perhaps, decisive to compel re-examination of the case."'27 The Court then held that the decision cited in
its remand order did control the result in Henry and required
reversal. 28
At the least, the Court's language casts serious doubt on any idea
that a remand for reconsideration "in light of' an intervening precedent is no more than a neutral suggestion that the court below study the
cited decision for whatever illumination it may shed on the correctness
of its initial judgment. Rather, the Court appears to be saying that
such orders are issued when the Justices have found enough similarity
between the case before them and the intervening decision to indicate,
as a prima facie matter, that the judgment below is in error, but that
because of other aspects of the case, the Court is not prepared to reverse outright. The cautionary circumstances may involve facts directly bearing on the issue adjudicated in the cited case, or they may
relate to alternate grounds that might support the judgment below even
if the lower court erred in its conclusion on the common issue. 29 Inany
event, the Court's account suggests that a reconsideration order, when
read together with the opinion below, may provide lawyers and lower
courts with some guidance about the scope or application of the ruling
laid down in the cited case. To that extent, the remand order does have
precedential value.
A similar conclusion is suggested by the brief discussion in a dissenting opinion in the 1978 Term. In Trustees ofKeene State College v.
23. See Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 375 U.S. 6 (1963), vacating241 S.C. 427, 128 S.E.2d
775 (1962).
24. City of Rock Hill v. Henry, 244 S.C. 74, 135 S.E.2d 718 (1963).
25. Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964) (per curiam).
26. Id at 776 (emphasis added).
27. Id at 777 (emphasis added).
28. Id at 777-78.
29. For example, compareUnited States v. Jacobs, 429 U.S. 909, 909-10 (1976) (Stevens,
J., concurring), with id at 910 (Marshall, J.,dissenting). See also Hellman, supra note 5, at
1720-21; The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, supra note 5, at 93-94.
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Sweeney,31 Justice Stevens, joined by three colleagues, emphasized that
when the Court issues a reconsideration order, it "is actingon the merits"; 3 once again, however, the opinion stopped short of saying that
such an order is a disposition on the merits. A case should not be remanded for reconsideration, Justice Stevens stated, "unless the intervening decision has shed new light on the law which, if it had been
available at the time of the [lower court's] decision, might have led to a
different result."32

II. An Empirical Study
To shed further light on this form of disposition, I examined all of
the cases-a total of 289 33-- in which reconsideration orders were issued during the five Terms 1975 through 1979.34 Several patterns
emerged. First, there were at least fifty cases in which the Court clearly
would have been justified in reversing outright. In some of them, the
lower court had come out on the wrong side of an intercircuit conflict
resolved by the intervening precedent.35 In others, the decision below
30. 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
31. Id at 25-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
32. Id at 26 (emphasis added).
33. This figure does not include the rare cases in which a summary reconsideration
directive was accompanied by a brief explanatory memorandum. See, e.g., Anders v. Floyd,
440 U.S. 445 (1979). Nor does it include the cases-also rare-in which reconsideration
orders were issued after oral argument. These were generally cases that were argued in
tandem with cases disposed of in full opinions. See, e.g., Richmond Unified School Dist. v.
Berg, 434 U.S. 158 (1977). See also infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
34. I selected this period in order to have a good chance of tracing all post-remand
proceedings in a substantial number of cases.
Here and in the remainder of this Article (unless otherwise stated), two or more cases
( e., docket numbers) arising out of a single judgment and disposed of in a single order will
be counted as one case. See, e.g., Armistead v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 448
U.S. 908 (1980) (five docket numbers; one case).
35. See, e.g., Sellers v. United States, 447 U.S. 932 (1980), vacating603 F.2d 53 (8th Cir.
1979) (overruled by Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 (1980)); United States v. Finazzo,
441 U.S. 929 (1979), vacating 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978) (overruled by Dalia v. United
States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979)); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, 441 U.S. 918 (1979), vacating
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (overruled in part by
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,295-316 (1979)); First of Omaha Serv. Corp. v. Iowa,
440 U.S. 969 (1979), vacating269 N.W.2d 409 (Iowa 1978) (overruled by Marquette Nat'l
Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978)); United States v. Smith, 434 U.S.
978 (1977), vacating543 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1976) (overruled by Commissioner v. Kowalski,
434 U.S. 77 (1977)); Saylors v. United States, 432 U.S. 903 (1977), vacating Collins v.
Ruinsfeld, 542 F.2d 1109 (1976) (overruled by United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864
(1977)); Reinhard v. Eagle Books, Inc., 432 U.S. 902 (1977), vacating418 F. Supp. 345 (N.D.
Ill.
1976) (overruled by Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977)); Seeber v. Alabama, 426 U.S.
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relied on a lower court ruling that the Supreme Court had reversed or
substantially modified 36 or on a Supreme Court decision that the Jus932 (1976), vacating502 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1974) (overruled by Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S.
167 (1976)).
For more recent examples, see United States Dep't of Educ. v. Seattle Univ., 456 U.S.
986 (1982), vacating621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980) (overruled by North Haven Bd. of Educ. v.
Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982)); Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 456 U.S. 968 (1982), vacating634 F.2d
774 (5th Cir. 1980) (overruled by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353 (1982)); NLRB v. H & D, Inc., 455 U.S. 902 (1982), vacating665 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1981)
(overruled by Charles D. Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1981)); Miller v.
Miller, 453 U.S. 918 (1981), vacating609 P.2d 1185 (Mont. 1980) (overruled by McCarty v.
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981)); Hawaii v. Mederios, 453 U.S. 902 (1981), vacatingAnthony
v. Wilkinson, 637 F.2d 1130 (7th Cir. 1980) (overruled by Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473
(1981)); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Murphy, 452 U.S. 957 (1981), vacating 629 F.2d 556 (8th
Cir. 1980) (overruled by Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205 (1981)); Consumers
Power Co. v. Utility Workers Union, 451 U.S. 1014, vacating 637 F.2d 1082 (6th Cir. 1981)
(overruled by Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981)); United States v.
Hicks, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981), vacating625 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1980) (overruled by Michael M.
v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)).
For the most part, these overrulings were not explicit; the term represents my own evaluation of the precedential effect of the cited case on the remanded decision.
36. For example, in Allen v. Monger, 583 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit
adopted the rationale of Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 575 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1978), in
striking down regulations that restricted military personnel in the circulation of petitions
addressed to members of Congress. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Huff and after
plenary consideration reversed the D.C. Circuit's decision. Secretary of the Navy v. Huff,
444 U.S. 453 (1980). The Court then vacated the judgment in Allen and remanded for reconsideration in light of Huff. Brown v. Allen, 444 U.S. 1063 (1980). (Upon remand, the
Ninth Circuit in turn remanded the case to the district court. Allen v. Monger, 619 F.2d 839
(9th Cir. 1980) (mem.). No further proceedings can be traced; presumably the district court
dismissed the complaint. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.)
For other examples, compare Doe v. Westby, 402 F. Supp. 140 (D.S.D. 1975), vacated,
433 U.S. 901 (1977), with Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); compareRobinson v. State, 143
Ga. App. 37, 237 S.E.2d 436 (1977), vacated,435 U.S. 991 (1978), with Ballew v. Georgia,
435 U.S. 223 (1978); compare State v. Hunt, 570 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S. 905 (1979), with Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); compare State v.
Barbour, 28 N.C. App. 259, 220 S.E.2d 812 (1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 903 (1977), with
Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977); compare Ferri v. Rosetti, 483 Pa. 327,
396 A.2d 1193, vacated,444 U.S. 987 (1979), with Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 (1979).
For more recent illustrations of this pattern, compareUnited States v. Elk, 682 F.2d 168
(8th Cir. 1982), vacated,459 U.S. 1167 (1983), with Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982);
compare United States v. Moschetta, 646 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1981), vacatedsub nonz United
States v. Spieler, 457 U.S. 1113 (1982), with United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982);
compare Glus v. G. C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated,451 U.S. 935
(1981), with Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981); compareReproductive Health Servs. v. Freeman, 614 F.2d 585 (8th Cir.), vacated,449 U.S. 809
(1980), with Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), and Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358
(1980); compareIn re Marriage of Milhan, 27 Cal. 3d 765, 613 P.2d 812, 166 Cal. Rptr. 533
(1980), vacatedsub nom. Milhan v. Milhan, 453 U.S. 918 (1981), with McCarty v. McCarty,
453 U.S. 210 .(1981); compare Besser v. Graham, 376 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1979), vacated,450
U.S. 962 (1981), with Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981); compare State v. Harris, 246
Ga. 759, 272 S.E.2d 719 (1980), vacated,452 U.S. 901 (1981), with Steagald v. United States,
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tices had overruled. 37 To these can be added about ninety cases in
which the judgment of the court below was only slightly less vulnerable: the facts appeared to vary in a way that arguably justified a result
different from the one reached by the intervening decision, but the rationale certainly seemed inconsistent.38
451 U.S. 204 (1981); compare Williams v. Luckey, 599 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980),
vacated, 456 U.S. 921 (1982), with Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
37. Compare Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers, 533 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1975) (relying
on per se rule established in United States v. Arnold, Schwiim & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)),
vacated,433 U.S. 904 (1977), with Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977) (repudiating per se rule of Schwinn); compareBrennan v. Indiana, 517 F.2d 1179 (7th
Cir. 1975) (relying on Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)), vacatedsub nom. Indiana v.
Usery, 427 U.S. 909 (1976), with National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
(overruling Wirtz).
In Ruggles v. California, 453 U.S. 919 (1981), the Supreme Court initially directed the
California court to reconsider, in light of Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), a judgment rejecting a Fourth Amendment claim. The California court did so and, relying in part
on Robbins, reversed its previous decision. California v. Ruggles, 125 Cal. App. 3d 473, 178
Cal. Rptr. 231 (1981). A few months later, the Supreme Court overruled Robbins. United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). The Court then granted the state's certiorari petition
and again remanded for reconsideration, this time in light of the overruling decision. California v. Ruggles, 459 U.S. 809 (1982), vacating 125 Cal. App. 3d 473, 178 Cal. Rptr. 231
(1981). On remand, the California court reinstated its initial ruling and affirmed the conviction. People v. Ruggles, 138 Cal. App. 3d 950, 188 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1983), hearinggranted,
No. 22994 (Mar. 2, 1983).
A few cases did not fit the particular patterns described in, the text, but it was equally
clear that the intervening decision had undercut the foundations of the vacated judgment.
Compare Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (narrowly limiting application of Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)), with Poulin v. Gunn, 548 F.2d 1379, 1380 n.I (9th Cir.) (relying
on Noia), vacated,434 U.S. 936 (1977); compareBryan v. Itasca Cobnty, 426 U.S. 373 (1976)
(reversing decision of Minnesota Supreme Court that adopted rationale of ruling by federal
district court in Nebraska), with Omaha Tribe of Indians v. Peters,- 516 F.2d 133 (8th Cir.
1975) (affirming judgment of Nebraska district court), vacated,427 U.S. 902 (1976). Among
more recent cases, compare Howell v. State Bar of Tex., 674 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1982),
vacated,460 U.S. 1065 (1983), with District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 482-83 n.16 (1983).
38. Compare Fusco v. Perini N. River Assocs., 601 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated,444
U.S. 1028 (1980), with P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69 (1979); compareUnited States v.
Humphries, 600 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1979), vacated,445 U.S. 956 (1980), with United States v.
Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980); compareTrustees of Boston Univ. v. NLRB, 575 F.2d 301 (1st
Cir. 1978), vacated,445 U.S. 912 (1980), with NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980);
compare United States v. Scully, 546 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated sub nom. United
States v. Cabral, 430 U.S. 902 (1977), with United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977);
compare Escobar v. S.S. Washington Trader, 503 F.2d 271 (9th Cir. 1974), vacatedsub nora
American Trading Transp. Co. v. Escobar, 423 U.S. 1070 (1975), with American Foreign S.S.
Co. v. Matise, 423 U.S. 150 (1975); compareState v. Connley, 295 N.C. 327, 245 S.E.2d 663
(1978), vacated,441 U.S. 929 (1979), with North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979). I
have been quite conservative in my characterizations; thus, many of the cases in this group
might well be viewed as no less doomed to reversal than those described in the text accompanying notes 35 through 37. See also Cates v. United States, 626 F.2d 399, 400 (5th Cir.
1980) (post-remand opinion) (although plenary decision construed different section of crimi-
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Study of the post-remand outcomes in the cases I have described
confirms these characterizations. There were ninety-one cases in which
the later proceedings could be traced. In only about fifteen of them did

the lower court adhere to its original disposition; and usually the court
did so, not by distinguishing the intervening decision, but by holding
that alternate grounds supported the initial result even though the
holding on the common issue could no longer stand.3 9 A few cases

were remanded to the trial court without any expression of views by the
court whose judgment had been vacated.40 In all of the other cases,
reconsideration led to a reversal or substantial modification of the earlier decision.4 1 It should be noted, moreover, that the cases in which
nal code, court concluded that similar result was required in vacated case because the two
statutes were "identically worded, ha[d] virtually the same legislative history, and create[d]
and punish[ed] closely parallel crimes").
For more recent illustrations, compareUnited States v. Armijo-Martinez, 669 F.2d 1131
(6th Cir.), vacated,459 U.S. 810 (1982), with United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S.
858, 860 n.2 (1982) (describing Sixth Circuit's position as "slight variation" of Ninth Circuit
rule rejected in plenary decision); compareWolfel v. Sanborn, 666 F.2d 1005 (6th Cir. 1981),
vacated, 458 U.S. 1102 (1982), with Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); compare
Brown v. Eckerd Drugs, Inc., 663 F.2d 1268 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated,457 U.S. 1128 (1982),
with General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982); compare Robbins v.
White-Wilson Medical Clinic, Inc., 660 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated,456 U.S. 969
(1982), with Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982); compare Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated,456 U.S. 1002 (1982), with Kremer
v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); compare Heritage Homes of Attleboro, Inc.
v. Seekonk Water Dist., 648 F.2d 761 (1st Cir.), vacated,454 U.S. 807 (1981), with City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); compareWaggoner v. Northwest Excavating, Inc., 642 F.2d 333, 338 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated,455 U.S. 931 (1982), with Kaiser
Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72 (1982); compare United States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336
(8th Cir. 1980), vacated,453 U.S. 918 (1981), with New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981);
compare People v. Miller, 110 Mich. App. 270, 312 N.W.2d 225 (1981), vacated,459 U.S.
1167 (1983), with New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Santora, 600 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding, after
reconsideration in light of Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979), that break-in and
bugging were valid, but reversing convictions because insufficiency of wiretap application
affidavits required exclusion of evidence); Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 586 F.2d 529
(5th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978), vitiated holding that city was not amenable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit, but reaffirming dismissal of complaint on ground that no constitutional violations were established);
People v. Graham, 76 A.D.2d 228, 431 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1980) (Graham I1) (holding, after
remand for reconsideration in light of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), that Payton
was not to be applied retroactively), vacated 458 U.S. 1101 (1982).
40. See, e.g., Thurston v. Dekle, 578 F.2d 1167 (5th Cir. 1978); State v. Hardy, 578
S.W.2d 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
41. See, e.g., Escobar v. S.S. Washington Trader, 640 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Humphries, 636 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,451 U.S. 988 (1981); United
States v. Sellers, 628 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir. 1980); Fusco v. Perini N. River Assocs., 622 F.2d
1111 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,449 U.S. 1131 (1981); Smith v. United States, 568 F.2d 357
(5th Cir. 1978); Collins v. Rumsfeld, 559 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cabral,
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post-remand dispositions were not published were generally the ones in
which the initial ruling was most clearly vitiated by the new precedent.4" In all likelihood nothing was published because the outcome
seemed so inevitable.
Given the history of the reconsideration order,4 3 it is hardly sur-

prising that so many of the cases receiving this form of disposition
would turn out to have been prime targets for reversal. But the study
also found about a dozen cases in which the decision of the court below
appears to have been so clearly in harmony with the intervening precedent that one wonders why the Court vacated the judgment at all,

rather than simply denying review.'

One possible explanation is that

the Court was following a policy of remanding all cases in which the
petitioner had raised issues similar to those adjudicated in a recent plenary decision, without looking very closely to determine whether the
lower court's ruling conflicted with the intervening precedent. If this
were so, of course, it would reduce to near zero the precedential value

of the reconsideration order.
To test this hypothesis, I examined all of the cases in the last three
Terms of the study45 in which the certiorari petition or jurisdictional
statement was held for an unusually long period of time before review
554 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,434 U.S. 870 (1977); Omaha Tribe of Indians v. Peters,
537 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1976); Alabama v. Seeber, 538 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1976); Robinson v.
State, 146 Ga. App. 318, 246 S.E.2d 518 (1978); State ex rel. Turner v. First of Omaha Serv.
Corp., 281 N.W.2d 452 (Iowa 1979); State v. Barbour, 34 N.C. App. 230, 237 S.E.2d 852
(1977); Ferri v. Rossetti, 488 Pa. 117, 411 A.2d 214 (1980).
42. Compare Carini v. United States, 528 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated,432 U.S. 902
(1977), with United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864 (1977); compare Brennan v. Indiana,
517 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1975), vacatedsub nom Indiana v. Usery, 427 U.S. 909 (1976), with
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); compareState v. Smith, 58 Ohio St.
2d 344, 390 N.E.2d 778 (1979), vacateg 448 U.S. 902 (1980), with Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56 (1980).
43. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
44. Compare Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977),
vacated, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), with City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389 (1978); comparePeople v. Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d 425, 606 P.2d 341, 162 Cal. Rptr.
306, vacate4448 U.S. 903 (1980), with Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980); compareMcShan
v. State, 150 Ga. App. 232, 257 S.E.2d 202 (1979), vacated,447 U.S. 901 (1980), with United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). See infra note 50; see also United States v. Williams, 558 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1977) (decision after remand).
In another group of cases, the vacated decision was probably inconsistent with the intervening precedent, but the court below had itself remanded for further proceedings; as a
result, the Supreme Court's remand order left the case in essentially the same posture that it
would have been in if the Justices had simply denied review. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
45. Other aspects of the Court's work during this period are described in Hellman, The
Supreme Court, the NationalLaw, and the Selection of Casesfor the Plenary Docket, 44 U.
PITr. L. REV. 521 (1983). See also Hellman, supra note 1.
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was denied.4 6 If a case involved an issue similar to one adjudicated in
a very recent plenary decision, I assumed that the application had been
held to await the disposition in the argued case.47 More than one hundred cases fit this pattern.4"
Comparison of these cases with those that were remanded leaves
no doubt that the Court was making at least some distinctions in its
handling of applications for review that had been held pending the decision of an argued case. In particular, when the lower court's judgment appeared on the surface to be consistent with the new precedent,
the Court almost invariably denied review rather than remanding.4 9
46. For present purposes, summary affirmances and dismissals in appeal cases are
treated as denials of review.
47. Justice Brennan has informed us that this is the Court's practice. Brennan, The
NationalCourt of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CM. L. REV. 473, 477-78 (1973).
48. This figure can be only an approximation. In cases where the delay in disposition
was minimal, or the similarity of issues attenuated, I could surmise that the application for
review had been held to await the plenary decision, but could not be confident that this was
so. See also infra note 65.
49. CompareUnited States v. Mearns, 599 F.2d 1296 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 934 (1980), with Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 (1980); compareUnited States v.
Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,444 U.S. 1043 (1980), with McLain v. Real
Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232 (1980); compareRoss v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312, 132122 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980), with Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122
(1980); compareUnited States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1305-06 n. I (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980), with United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); compare
Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 587 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,445 U.S. 942 (1980),
with Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980); compareLoe v. Armistead, 582
F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub non Moffit v. Loe, 446 U.S. 928 (1980), with
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); compare United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175 (8th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied,443 U.S. 911 (1979), with Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979);
compare Mattern v. Mathews, 582 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. deniedsubnom Califano v.
Mattern, 443 U.S. 912 (1979), with Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979); compare
United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 579 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978) (on denial of rehearing),
cert. deniedsub noa.Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 443 U.S. 915 (1979), with
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); compareUnited States v. Volpe, 578
F.2d 1372 (2d Cir. 1978), afgmem. 430 F. Supp. 931 (D. Conn. 1977), cert.denied,441 U.S.
930 (1979), with Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979); compare Samuels v. Empresa
Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 887-80 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,443 U.S. 915
(1979), with Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979); compareJohnson v. Lefkowitz, 566 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979),
with Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); compareKoerner v. United States, 550 F.2d 1362
(4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,434 U.S. 984 (1977), with Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S.
77 (1977); compareZinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1008 (1978), with United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977); compare United
States v. Oliver, 546 F.2d 1096 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,435 U.S. 914 (1978), with Durst v.
United States, 434 U.S. 542 (1978); compareUnited States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546
F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,434 U.S. 1008 (1978), with United States v. New York
Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
For more recent examples, compareUnited States v. Sher, 657 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied,458 U.S. 1121 (1982), with Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982); com-
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Reconsideration orders may have been issued in the remaining cases as
the result of carelessness or error, or perhaps the Justices saw unresolved difficulties in the rulings below that have escaped me.50 In any
event, the totality of the evidence discussed thus far continues to support the view that a reconsideration order, if not tantamount to reversal, does indicate a strong leaning in that direction.
It is all the more striking, therefore, that among the remanded
cases in which there was at least a surface inconsistency between the
vacated judgment and the cited decision, the study found more than
sixty in which the lower court, upon reconsideration, adhered to its
original judgment. Sometimes the court conceded that the decision
cited by the Supreme Court was squarely on point, reversed its ruling
on the issue the Justices had addressed, and went on to find that its
earlier judgment could be upheld on some other ground." More often,
pare International Union of Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094,
1106-07 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981), with County of Washington v.
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981); compareLiotta v. National Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.
1980), cert.denied,451 U.S. 970 (1981), with United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S.
56 (1981); compareWallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,451 U.S. 969
(1981), with Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); compareAlabama v. Marshall,
626 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub non Donovan v. Alabama, 452 U.S. 905
(1981), with St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981);
compare Cose v. Cose, 592 P.2d 1230 (Alaska 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981), with
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
50. The courts to which the cases were remanded appear to have shared the view that
such action was unnecessary. As far as published materials reveal, reconsideration generally
led to the reinstatement of essentially the same judgments. See, e.g., Kurek v. Pleasure
Driveway & Park Dist., 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978); People v. Velasquez, 28 Cal. 3d 461,
622 P.2d 952, 171 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1980); McShan v. State, 155 Ga. App. 518, 271 S.E.2d 659
(1980).
In addition, there were a few cases in which review was denied even though the lower
court's ruling seemed, on the surface, to warrant reconsideration at least as much as some of
the cases in which reconsideration orders were issued. See, e.g., Blarney v. Brown, 270
N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978), cert. denied,444 U.S. 1070 (1980), discussedinfranotes 64-76. For
a more recent (and bizarre) example, compare Matter of Greene, 54 N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d
390, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1981), cert.denied,455 U.S. 1035 (1982) (review denied over dissents
of four Justices who would vacate for reconsideration in light of intervening decision in In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982)), with Alessi v. Committee on Professional Standards, 88 A.D.2d
1089, 451 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1982) (memorandum decision based on New York Court of Appeals decision in Greene), vacated,460 U.S. 1077 (1983) (remanded for reconsideration in
See also United States v. Brown, 602 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.denied,
light of k.J.).
446 U.S. 966 (1980), discussedinfra note 76. In the vast majority of the cases, however, there
was no reason not to deny review, since the lower court's ruling appeared clearly consistent
with the new precedent. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 66-96.
51. See, e.g., Meeks v. Havener, 545 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1976) (harmless error), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 911 (1977); Hughes v. Hughes, 372 So. 2d 845 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) (benefits of
alimony statute extended to men as well as women, thus removing infirmity condemned in
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the court determined that the rule set forth in the intervening decision

did not apply,52 or that if it did apply, the facts were sufficiently distinguishable to justify a different result from that of the cited case.

3

intervening Supreme Court decision), appeal dismissed,444 U.S. 1061 (1980). See also supra
note 39. In some cases, e.g., People v. Graham, 76 A.D.2d 228, 431 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1980)
(Graham11), vacated, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982), the court did not actually reverse its prior ruling
on the common issue, but in effect conceded arguendothat it was in error.
For more recent examples of this pattern, see Waggoner v. Northwest Excavating, Inc.,
685 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1982) (addressing "hot cargo" defense that court had previously held
could not be considered, but rejecting it on the merits), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1109 (1983);
People v. Graham, 90 A.D.2d 198, 457 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1982) (Graham 111) (harmless error,
dissipation of taint), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 246 (1983); State v. Williams, 6 Ohio St. 3d 281,
290, 452 N.E.2d 1323, 1333-34 (harmless error), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 554 (1983).
52. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, 603 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1979) (case controlled by
earlier precedent rather than by intervening decision), aff'dsub nom. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429 (1980); United States v. McCrane, 547 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1976) (alternative
holding); Chateau X, Inc. v. State, 302 N.C. 321, 330, 275 S.E.2d 443, 449 (1981) ("our laws
do not share the constitutional infirmities of [the law struck down in the plenary decision],
and the principles enunciated in [the plenary decision] do not control").
For more recent examples, see Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 702 F.2d 137 (8th
Cir.) (after intervening remand to district court), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 272 (1983), cert.
dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 2163 (1984); Women's Servs., P.C. v. Thone, 690 F.2d 667 (8th Cir.
1982) (holding that intervening decision did not impose new standard of review of abortion
statutes), vacated sub nom. Kerrey v. Women's Servs., 103 S. Ct. 3102 (1983); Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 677 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1982) (case is governed by later
Supreme Court decision rather than by decision cited in reconsideration order), qaf'd,462
U.S. 324 (1983); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1981) (burdens of
the parties in a Title VII disparate impact case are "governed by clear and recent Supreme
Court precedent unaltered by" disparate treatment decision cited in remand order), cert.
denied,459 U.S. 967 (1982); People v. Riegler, 127 Cal. App. 3d 317, 327, 179 Cal. Rptr. 530,
537 (1981) (decision cited in remand order "is inapplicable to the facts of this case"), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 3564 (1983); State v. Blakney, 641 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Mont. 1982) (decision
cited in remand order is "inapposite both factually and legally to" remanded case), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3569 (1983).
53. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Allen v. Franzen, 659 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied,456 U.S. 928 (1982); United States v. McCrane, 547 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1976) (alternative holding); James v. United States, 542 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,429 U.S. 1093
(1977); In re Patrick W., 104 Cal. App. 3d 615, 163 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1096 (1981); Songer v. State, 365 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 956
(1979); Lebowitz v. State, 343 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), eert. denied,441 U.S. 932
(1979); Davis v. State, 246 Ga. 432, 271 S.E.2d 828 (1980), cert. denied,451 U.S. 921 (1981);
People v. Hall, 66 Ill. App. 3d 891, 384 N.E.2d 578 (1979), cert. denied,444 U.S. 1012 (1980);
Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 272 N.W.2d 888 (1978), rev'd,444 U.S. 320 (1980); Tiffany
Constr. Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 96 N.M. 296, 629 P.2d 1225 (1981), motion to direct Clerk
tofilepetitionfor certioraridenied,454 U.S. 1026 (1981).
For more recent examples, see Music v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension
Trust Fund, 712 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1983); Myers v. Washington, 702 F.2d 766 (9th Cir.
1983); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 695 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1983); Longval v.
Meachum, 693 F.2d 236 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied,460 U.S. 1098 (1983); Henry v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 3566 (1983);
Thompson v. White, 680 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1177 (1983);
Lonberger v. Jago, 651 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459
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The frequency with which lower courts reinstated their pre-remand decisions could be explained in either of two ways: the courts
may have disregarded the law laid down by the Supreme Court, or the
Court may have issued reconsideration orders in a substantial number
of controversies that were not necessarily controlled by the intervening
precedent. The best evidence on this point lies in the subsequent history of the cases in which the lower courts adhered to their prior determinations. Most of the litigants who had obtained the remand orders
in the first round of proceedings sought Supreme Court review once
again, but very few of them succeeded in overturning the reinstated
judgments. Only twelve cases out of more than fifty received plenary
consideration, 4 and only six of those were reversed.5 Two decisions
were reversed or vacated summarily.5 6 For the most part, the Court
simply denied certiorari, usually without any notation of dissent. 7
The data thus support the second of the suggested hypotheses:
while the Court does not automatically direct reconsideration of all
cases that have been set aside to await the announcement of a plenary
decision, 8 the criteria for this mode of disposition are not exacting.
Specifically, a general similarity of issues and a surface inconsistency in

results will usually suffice to persuade the Justices to remand a case
rather than deny review. The courts that have been directed to reconsider their prior decisions are therefore correct in thinking that a reU.S. 422 (1983); Wantland v. State, 49 Md. App. 636, 435 A.2d 102 (1981), cert. denied,457
U.S. 1121 (1982).
54. The discussion in this section of the text is limited to cases in which the lower court
adhered to its prior determination notwithstanding at least a surface incompatibility with the
intervening precedent.
55. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420
(1981); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
Of the other cases, five were affirmed and one was dismissed. Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct.
2404 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303 (1980); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) (affirmed in part and reversed in
part); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); United States v. Jacobs, 436 U.S. 31 (1978) (writ
dismissed as improvidently granted).
Technically, Chakrabartywas not an affirmance of the case previously remanded by the
Court, but of a companion case. See 447 U.S. at 306-07.
56. Graham v. New York, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982) (Graham I1), discussedsupra note 51;
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (summary reversal).
57. Dissents were filed in only 14 cases; five of the dissents were routine death penalty
statements by Justices Brennan and Marshall. See, e.g., Baker v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 936
(1981).
58. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; infratext accompanying notes 66-96. For
a brief discussion of the process by which the Court makes the antecedent determination to
hold a case for an impending plenary decision, see infra note 127.
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mand order "should not be read as implying that [the cited authority]
necessarily mandates reversal. [Rather,] the Court has merely 'flagged'
[the remanded case] as one upon which the intervening decision may
have some bearing. . .. "
By the same token, the findings of the study suggest that courts
and lawyers should exercise great caution in using reconsideration orders as a source of precedential guidance in other disputes. A number
of courts have indeed taken this position, declining to read these dispositions as deciding anything beyond what was adjudicated in the authority cited.6 0 However, not all courts have been so circumspect. For
example, at least two cases have interpreted reconsideration orders as
equivalent to holdings that the cited decisions were to be applied retroactively. 6 ' Some courts have read such dispositions as indicating that a
rule announced in a plenary decision interpreting one statute also applied to the different statute involved in the remanded case. 2 In other
59. Bush v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 575 (5th Cir. 1981), af'd,103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983). See
also In re Patrick W., 104 Cal. App. 3d 615, 618, 163 Cal. Rptr. 848, 850 (1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1096 (1981).
60. See, e.g., Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126, 1131 n.9 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'd,455 U.S.
603 (1982); United States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236, 252 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,444 U.S.
991 (1979); United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122, 126 (10th Cir. 1979). See also Virgin
Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582, 592 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1981) (acknowledging reconsideration
order, but declining to read it as holding that vacated judgment was inconsistent with decision cited).
61. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 586 F.2d 683, 688-89 (9th Cir.
1978); People v. Minjares, 24 Cal. 3d 410,421 n.6, 591 P.2d 514, 520, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224,228,
cert. denied,444 U.S. 887 (1979). See also United States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540, 1544 (10th
Cir. 1983) ("That Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)] is to be given retrospective
application is made all the more clear by the Supreme Court's remand, within a week after
handing down Edwards,of six cases for reconsideration in light of that opinion."); Poulin v.
Gunn, 589 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1978). But see United States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236,252
(6th Cir.) (remand order did not necessarily indicate that Court intended that intervening
decision should be applied retroactively; Court might have remanded only to permit lower
court to consider issue of retroactivity), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979). See infra notes
117-25 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., United States v. East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc., 564 F.2d 179, 185 (5th
Cir. 1977) (reconsideration order gives "fairly strong indication" that principles set forth in
Title VII case are to be applied to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); United States v. Trzcinski, 553 F.2d 851, 855 n.4 (3d Cir. 1976) (relying on plenary decision interpreting bank
robbery statute to construe law proscribing possession of stolen government property; finding it "significant" that Court vacated a government property case for reconsideration in
light of the bank robbery decision); Saint Elizabeth Hosp. v. Califano, 441 F. Supp. 158,
159-60 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (interpreting remand order as precluding general federal question
jurisdiction over Medicare suits; plenary decision had rejected district court jurisdiction
under Administrative Procedure Act in Social Security cases).
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as holdings on the
cases, too, reconsideration orders have been treated
63
merits having at least some precedential value.
III.

Denial of Review in Held Cases

While the findings of the study tend to support a narrow view of
the precedential significance of the GVR, they have very different implications for the meaning of a limited but important class of certiorari
denials. Specifically, the study suggests that when the Court denies review rather than issuing a reconsideration order in a case obviously
held pending the announcement of a plenary decision, its action--contrary to the usual rule'---can
be deemed to have at least some prece6
1
significance.
dential
In Blarney v. Brown,66 for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court
upheld the state's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the operator of
a tavern located just outside the state's borders. The defendant sought
review by the United States Supreme Court. The Court held the petition for more than a year, then denied review in an order included on
the first list issued after the announcement of the plenary decision in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.6 7 Three years later, the
Minnesota court overruled Blarney, holding that it was "plainly contrary to constitutional principles authoritatively declared by the United
States Supreme Court" in World-Wide Volkswagen and a companion
63. See, e.g., Rasimas v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614, 621 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2151 (1984); United States v. Mahoney, 712 F.2d 956, 959 (5th
Cir. 1983) ("By remanding [a court of appeals case] for reconsideration in light of the fourth
amendment standards announced in [the intervening decision], the Court perforce instructed
that state law did not control the case and that the admissibility of evidence depends on the
legality of the search and seizure under federal law."); Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126,
1136-37 (6th Cir. 1981) (Engel, J., dissenting), rev', 455 U.S. 603 (1982); Aware Woman
Clinic, Inc. v. City of Cocoa Beach, 629 F.2d 1146, 1148-49 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1980); Ratcliff v.
Estelle, 597 F.2d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 1979); Penk v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 99
F.R.D. 508, 509 (D. Or. 1982) (reconsideration order in case involving similar issue indicates
that analysis in district court's prior opinion "is no longer valid"). Cf.McDonald v. Johnson
& Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370, 1374 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1983), discussed infra note 96.
64. See generally Linzer, The Meaningof CertiorariDenials, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1227
(1979). See also Hellman, supra note 1, at 810-11.
65. Usually there will be little difficulty in identifying a case as one that has been held
to await the announcement of a pending plenary decision; the delay in disposition and the
similarity of issues will not readily admit of any other conclusion. See supranotes 47-48 and
accompanying text. Of course, the more attenuated these characteristics become, the more
imprudent it would be to attach significance to the denial of review, even under the analysis
suggested here.
66. 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978), cert. denied,444 U.S. 1070 (1980).
67. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In this landmark case the Supreme Court "cast some doubt on
20 years worth of jurisdictional doctrine developed by the lower courts." J. LANDERS & J.
MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 98 (1981).
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case handed down on the same day.6 8 The Minnesota court made no
mention of the fact that the Supreme Court had denied review in
Blarney immediately after the decision in World- Wide Volkswagen. Yet
the Supreme Court's contemporaneous practices, as described in the
preceding pages, suggest that if the Justices had had any doubts about
whether Blarney was consistent with World- Wide Volkswagen, they
would have vacated the judgment rather than deny review.6 9
-Itis true that the denial of certiorari ordinarily has no precedential
value.7" It is also true that the rationale of the Blarney decision, with its
broad view of the "foreseeability" criterion and its emphasis on the

interests of the forum state, is not easily reconciled with the Supreme
Court's opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen.7 ' But the Supreme Court
reviews judgments, not opinions.7 2 And in the circumstances that ob-

tained, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Court did "consider the merits of' the Blarney ruling7 3 and saw not even the modest
degree of inconsistency that is generally sufficient to persuade the
Court to remand rather than deny review.7 4 This conclusion is
68. West Am. Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Minn. 1983). The companion case to World-Wide Volkswagen was Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
69. It may be argued that the denial of certiorari in Blarney rested on the ground that
the state court's judgment was not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).
However, the case appears to fall precisely within the scope of the rule applied in Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,485 (1975), and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
195-96 n.12 (1977), to sustain jurisdiction over state court judgments that were technically
nonfinal. Indeed, World-Wide Volkswagen itself came to the Court in the same procedural
posture as Blamey, yet the Court did not even allude to a possible jurisdictional defect.
70. See supra note 64.

71. In Blarney, the Minnesota court relied in part on the fact that it was foreseeable to
the defendant that serving alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person could lead to consequences in Minnesota. 270 N.W.2d at 888. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court
rejected that type of foreseeability; rather, the question was whether "the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there." 444 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added). The Minnesota court also
gave weight to the "strong" interest of the state in providing a forum, 270 N.W.2d at 888,
while the United States Supreme Court held that that interest could be outweighed by considerations of "interstate federalism" that the Minnesota court never mentioned. See 444
U.S. at 294.
72. See Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956); see also Warren v. Mississippi, 444 U.S. 956, 957 (1979) (White, J., joined by Brennan and Stewart, JJ., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) ("[C]ertiorari is sometimes denied when a judgment can be defended on a ground not relied on by the court below.").
73. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
74. This conclusion is not as implausible as it might seem at first glance. While the
Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen did say that a nondomiciliary can be sued only
when it "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State," 444 U.S. at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)), the Court left
open the possibility that "purposeful activity" could be defined in a way that would encompass the conduct of the tavern owner in Blarney. In particular, the Court distinguished be-
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strengthened by the fact that on the same day that it denied certiorari
in Blarney, the Court vacated the judgment in a Colorado case raising
similar issues.7 5 At the least, it is questionable whether the Minnesota
court should have been so willing to overturn one of its own precedents
when the United States Supreme Court had so conspicuously refused to
disturb that precedent.7 6
It may seem paradoxical, and even perverse, to attribute precedential significance to some denials of certiorari while minimizing the precedential value of orders in which the Court vacates the judgment
below. But the paradox disappears if, as the findings of this study suggest, the Court ordinarily issues reconsideration orders whenever the
lower court's ruling is even arguably vitiated by the intervening decision and denies review only when the judgment is perceived as clearly
in accord with the plenary opinion.
There is, however, one aspect of this analysis that deserves further
explication. The evidence set forth thus far demonstrates that the
Court remands for reconsideration a substantial number of cases that
tween situations where the sale in the forum state is an "isolated occurrence" and those
where it arises "from . . . efforts . . . to serve, directy or indirecty, the market for [the
defendant's] product in other States." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (emphasis
added). The Court also emphasized that the plaintiffs' claim in World-Wide Volkswagen
arose out of "the fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New York to
New York residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing through Oklahoma." Id
at 295. In Blarney, on the other hand, the defendant's connection with the forum state was
neither isolated nor fortuitous. The defendant owned a tavern just across the state line from
Minnesota, only 15 miles from the state's major metropolitan area. The tavern was able to
stay open six hours later each night than similar establishments in Minnesota. Further,
although the record did not show the specific percentage of the tavern's business that was
attributable to Minnesotans, the defendant did not deny that he did business with residents
of the forum state. Blamey, 270 N.W.2d at 888. Under these circumstances, the Supreme
Court might well have concluded that the criterion of "purposeful activity" was satisfied.
Accord, R.

CASAD,

JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS

7.02[2][b][ii] (1983) (The Supreme

Court, after World-Wide Volkswagen, probably would uphold jurisdiction in cases like
Blarney, where the defendant was aware that a significant number of his customers would
drive into the forum state after leaving a tavern near the border).
75. Eschmann Bros. & Walsh, Ltd. v. V. Mueller & Co., 444 U.S. 1063 (1980). In the
same order list, the Court agreed to review another decision of the Minnesota Supreme
Court, this one involving a constitutional challenge to the application of Minnesota law to a
case arising out of a Wisconsin accident. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 444 U.S. 1070
(1980), grantingcert. to 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1979). A choice-of-law issue also had been
adjudicated in Blarey, but the petitioner had not raised it in the Supreme Court, nor (apparently) had he couched it as a federal question in the state courts.
76. In the same vein, compare United States v. Brown, 602 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980) (review denied one week after decision in Busic v. United
States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980)), with United States v. Diogenes, 638 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981)
(apparently repudiating Brown on the authority of Busic; no reference to fact that review
was denied in Brown after Supreme Court decision in Busic).
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prove to be consistent with its newly announced decisions. But does
that necessarily mean that the Court never denies review in held cases
that are not consistent? In theory, no. The GVR category could be
under- as well as over-inclusive. Upon reflection, however, this possibility seems quite remote. It is difficult to believe that the Court, having put a case aside to await a pending decision, would then allow the
judgment to stand in the face of a perceived inconsistency with the new
precedent. The supposition is rendered even more implausible by the
fact that the Court has issued reconsideration orders in cases where
distinctions that would readily have justified the denial of review were
evident either in the lower court's opinion or in the opinion of the
Supreme Court itself.7 7 Nor is it easy to discern what other criteria
might have guided the Justices in determining which of the held cases
were to be remanded and which denied review.
Further scrutiny of the empirical data supports this analysis. In
the overwhelming majority of the held/denied cases in the study,7 8 the
lower court's judgment was clearly in accord with the intervening decision.7 9 And while perhaps twenty percent of the cases appear, at first
glance, to present inconsistencies of one sort or another, closer examination generally reveals circumstances that adequately explain why review was denied. Sometimes there was a procedural barrier to the
Court's consideration of the common issue.80 More often, the facts or
77. See, e.g., Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 628 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1980) (discriminatory
impact case under Title VII), vacated, 451 U.S. 902 (1981) (remanded for reconsideration in
light of Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), a discriminatory
treatment case, notwithstanding Court's emphasis in Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252 n.5, that discriminatory impact cases differ in factual issues and character of evidence presented); Jesse
W. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 893, 576 P.2d 963, 145 Cal. Rptr. 1 (juvenile court may
review advisory determination by referee without violating Double Jeopardy Clause, but
may not hold de novo hearing), vacatedsub nom. California v. Jesse W., 439 U.S. 922 (1978)
(remanded for reconsideration in light of Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978), even
though Court, in holding that Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit state officials from
taking exceptions to proposed findings by juvenile master, emphasized that the juveniles in
the case before it were "subjected to only one proceeding," id. at 218.).
As previously discussed, the Court has even issued reconsideration orders in cases that
on the surface appeared to be clearly consistent with the intervening decision. See supra
notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
78. As noted earlier, empirical data on certiorari denials are available only for the three
Terms 1977 through 1979. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., cases cited supranote 49. See also Melanson v. Caribou Reefers, Ltd., 667
F.2d 213 (1st Cir. 1981) (explaining why Raymond v. I/S Caribia, 626 F.2d 203 (1st Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 969 (1981), is consistent with Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v.
De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981)).
80. See, e.g., State v. Atkins, 360 So. 2d 1341 (La. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 927
(1979) (case apparently held pending decision in Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979);
although petitioner raised federal claim identical to one sustained in Burch, Court denied
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the legal setting differed in a way that justified a result superficially

opposed to that of the plenary opinion.8" Of the hundred or so cases in
review, "it appearing that the judgment below rest[ed] on independent and adequate state
grounds.").
81. Compare Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding that
state court violated First Amendment by excluding public and press from criminal trial;
court had made no findings to support closure), with Merola v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 985, 393
N.E.2d 1038, 419 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1979) (affirming order excluding press and public from
pretrial suppression hearing; court below had explained in detail why closure was necessary
to protect defendant's rights), cert. denied,448 U.S. 910 (1980) (three Justices dissenting);
compare Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980) (holding that statute authorizing enhanced penalties for defendant who uses or carries a firearm while committing a federal
felony may not be applied to defendant who uses a firearm in the course of a felony proscribed by a statute that itself authorizes enhancement if a dangerous weapon is used), with
West v. United States, 609 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that enhancement statute may
be applied to defendant convicted under law that prohibits bank robbery by assaulting and
killing but does not specify means employed), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980); compare
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (holding that without warrant, police may not
enter private residence to make routine felony arrest; noting that the Court had "no occasion
to consider" what kinds of "exigent circumstances" might justify warrantless entry for purpose of arrest), with United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1146-48 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that warrantless entry into apartment to arrest defendant was justified by exigent
circumstances), cert. denied,446 U.S. 907 (1980), and State v. Jones, 274 N.W.2d 273 (Iowa
1979) (same), cert. denied,446 U.S. 907 (1980); compare Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96
n.10 (1979) (rejecting plaintiffs' claim that mandatory retirement statute denied equal protection by discriminating on basis ofjob classification, but noting that plaintiffs abandoned
claim of discrimination on basis of age), with Gault v. Garrison, 569 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1977)
(holding that trial court erred in rejecting claim that school board's mandatory retirement
policy violated Equal Protection Clause), cert. denied,440 U.S. 945 (1979); compare Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762, 764 n. 11 (1979) (holding that conviction had been properly
reversed on Fourth Amendment grounds where officers had suitcase exclusively within their
control at time of search; state did not argue that luggage had been searched incident to
arrest), with People v. De Santis, 46 N.Y.2d 82, 385 N.E.2d 577, 412 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1978)
(affirming conviction where police had not gained exclusive control of unlocked suitcase and
search had close nexus to time and place of arrest), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 912 (1979).
For more recent examples, compare U.S. Industries/Federal Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 455 U.S. 608 (1982) (holding that court of appeals erred in invoking statutory
presumption on employee's behalf), with Hensley v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Auth., 655 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that employee's claim to compensation rested
on overwhelming evidence irrespective of statutory presumption; employer's certiorari petition asserted only that court of appeals had improperly reweighed evidence), cert denied,
456 U.S. 904 (1982); compare Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (holding that
court of appeals, in finding Title VII violation, failed to give adequate deference to district
court's findings on intent to discriminate in operation of seniority system), with Sears v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 645 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1981) (affirming district court's finding
that union violated Title VII by perpetuating effects of prior discrimination in non-bona fide
seniority system), cert. deniedsub nom United Transp. Union v. Sears, 456 U.S. 964 (1982);
compare Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that valid waiver of Miranda
rights requires that accused initiate further communication with police), with Commonwealth v. Rigler, 488 Pa. 441, 412 A.2d 846 (1980) (finding valid waiver where defendant,
after being informed of Mirandarights, initiated questioning that led to incriminating statement), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1016 (1981), and Bartlett v. State, 387 So. 2d 886 (Ala. Crim.
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the three Terms that I studied, there were no more than half a dozen
like Blarney, in which doubt remained that the lower court's ruling
could be reconciled with the new precedent.8 2 These cases are troublesome, but I am reluctant to conclude that the Court, after recognizing
the relevance of an impending decision, would decline to disturb a

judgment that was not only inconsistent on the surface but also lacking
in any distinguishing features. The more plausible inference-espe-

cially in view of the low threshold for reconsideration orders-is that
the Justices did see distinctions, albeit more subtle ones, between the
lower court rulings and the new precedents.83
In any event, I do not suggest that the denial of review in a held
case should be regarded as tantamount to atfirmance. Rather, courts
and lawyers should examine the relevant decisions carefully and take
into account the full context of the Court's actions. For example,
where procedural barriers would prevent the Court from considering
an issue, it would be foolish to assume that the denial of review constitutes any kind of statement on the merits. On the other hand, such a
conclusion need not be foreclosed by the circumstance that the lower
court relied on a rationale repudiated by the intervening decision if the

facts stated in the lower court's opinion provide grounds for reconciling
the judgment with the new precedent.8 4 The Court's actions in related
App. 1980) (finding valid waiver where defendant, after failing to reach attorney by telephone, said he would give statement; attorney arrived and advised defendant to sign statement), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1016 (1981); compare Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (reversing judgment favoring plaintiff in employment discrimination suit on ground that court of appeals improperly allocated evidentiary burdens), with
Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1980) (upholding plaintiffs employment discrimination claim, but applying rules on allocation of proof similar to those adopted by
Supreme Court in Burdine), cert. denied,450 U.S. 979 (1981).
82. In addition to Blamey, the most problematic cases are Sink v. United States, discussed infra note 85; Randle v. Beal, 440 U.S. 957 (1979), discussed infra note 83; Michigan
v. James, 439 U.S. 1121 (1979) (no reported decision below; holding summarized at 47
U.S.L.W. 3230 (1978)); United States v. Sorrell, 436 U.S. 949 (1978), discussed infra note 84;
and Brown v. United States, 446 U.S. 966 (1978), discussed supra note 76.
83. For example, in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 334 (1979), the Court noted an
"apparent conffict" between the decision below and the Third Circuit's decision in Fanty v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 551 F.2d 2 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. deniedsubnom. Randle
v. Beal, 440 U.S. 957 (1979). Nevertheless, two weeks after affirming the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Jordan, the Court denied review in Fanty. While it is difficult to reconcile the
Court's actions in the two cases, there is at least a possibility that the Justices shared the view
of the concurring judge in the Third Circuit that there was no case or controversy. See
Jordan,440 U.S. at 334 n.2.
84. A good illustration is United States v. Sorrell, 562 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 949 (1978), in which the Court denied review shortly after the plenary
decision in United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978), reversing 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir.
1976). In Mauro,the Second Circuit held that a writ of habeas corpus adprosequendumis a
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cases may also provide clues.8 5
The importance of context is dramatically illustrated by a pair of
orders issued on the same day in February, 1983. In Ostrofe v. H.S.

Crocker Co.,8 6 the Ninth Circuit held that an employee discharged for
"detainer" within the meaning of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, thus entitling the
defendant to certain procedural rights. In Sorrell, the Third Circuit not only reached the
same result, but also stated that Mauro was "substantially identic" to the case before it.
Sorrell,562 F.2d at 231. Nevertheless, the reversal in Mauro did not compel reversal in
Sorrell because of a distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in the plenary opinion. Although the Court, rejecting the position adopted by both circuits, held that a writ of habeas
corpus adprsequendum does not itself trigger the protections of the Detainer Agreement,
436 U.S. at 361, the Court also held that the lodging of a detainer followed by the issuance
of a writ does require compliance with the Agreement. Id at 361-62. In Sorrell,the Government had lodged a document labelled a "detainer" with the warden who had custody of
the defendant. See 562 F.2d at 230 n.6. Indeed, the dissenting opinion in Sorrell insisted
that the majority's discussion of the definitional issue was dictum, because "in both cases
[Sorrell and its companion case] detainers in the customary form had been lodged by the
United States Marshal before the writs of habeas corpus were served." United States v.
Thompson, 562 F.2d 232, 237 n.5 (3d Cir. 1977) (Weis, J., dissenting), cert. denied,436 U.S.
949 (1978). (Sorrell and Thompson were decided together in the Third Circuit and were
presented to the Supreme Court in a single certiorari petition.) See generally Brown v.
Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835, 838 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981).
85. For example, at first glance it is difficult to understand why the Court, having held
United States v. Sink, 586 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 912 (1979), to
await the decision in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), would then deny review.
The Fifth Circuit apparently conceded that the search in Sink would have been impermissible even under United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). See 586 F.2d at 1048 n.8.
Sanders not only reaffirmed Chadwick but arguably took its holding one step further. See
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (repudiating rationale but not the narrow holding
of Sanders). The probable explanation is that the Fifth Circuit had upheld the admission of
the evidence on the authority of circuit precedent denying retroactive effect to Chadwick, see
586 F.2d at 1048 n.8, and the Supreme Court was not yet ready to address the retroactivity
issue. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982) (establishing new rule for retroactivity of Fourth Amendment decisions).
This interpretation is not inconsistent with the issuance of a reconsideration order in
Robbins v. California, 443 U.S. 903 (1979)-another case held to await Sanders--since the
California courts apparently assumed that the Chadwick decision was to be applied retroactively. See People v. Minjares, 79 Cal. App. 3d 923, 145 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1978) (distinguishing Chadwick), rev'd, 24 Cal. 3d 410, 591 P.2d 514, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1979) (explicitly
holding that Chadwickwas to be applied retroactively), cert.denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979). In
other words, the Court may have taken the position that courts that were applying Chadwick
retroactively should be given the opportunity to reconsider their Chadwick cases in light of
the gloss furnished by Sanders, but that where the court below had applied pre-Chadwick
law (and presumably would continue to do so), there would be no point in requiring reconsideration because Sanders would not affect the result.
It is also possible that review was denied in Sink on the ground that the Fifth Circuit
was wrong in assuming that the case fell within the scope of Chadwick- in Sink, the court
found that the officers had probable cause to search the defendant's automobile, 586 F.2d at
1048, whereas probable cause to search the vehicle was lacking in both Chadwick and Sanders. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 817 (1982).
86. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated,460 U.S. 1007 (1983).
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refusing to participate in his employer's alleged antitrust violations had
standing to bring a treble damages action under the Clayton Act. A
few months later, the Seventh Circuit, in Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 7

explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's rationale and denied standing on
virtually identical facts.88 Certiorari was sought in both cases, and both
89 a
were held to await the decision in Associated General Contractors,

plenary case addressing the issue of antitrust standing in a very different factual context.90 A week after the plenary decision was handed
down, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment in Os91 and denied certiorari in Bichan.92 Here, even more than in
trofe
Blarney, the conclusion seems inescapable that the Court considered the
merits of the lower court ruling in Bichan and concluded that it was
harmonious with the new precedent.93
Admittedly, it seems equally clear that the reconsideration order
in Ostrofe rested on a determination that the Ninth Circuit's judgment
was not consistent with the intervening decision. But that is true only
because of the simultaneous denial of review in Bichan. Were it not for
that action, the Ninth Circuit would easily have been able to distinguish Associated GeneralContractorsand reinstate its prior ruling. The

factual contexts of the two cases were quite different, and the Supreme
Court, repudiating the possibility of "a black-letter rule that will dictate
the result in every case," itself had emphasized that each situation must
be analyzed in light of an array of factors set forth in its opinion. 94
Moreover, in another case remanded for reconsideration in light of Associated General Contractors,the Fifth Circuit had no difficulty in ad-

hering to its previous decision rejecting a challenge to an antitrust
plaintiff's standing in yet a different context. 95 Thus, ironic though it
87. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub
nom. Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 460 U.S. 1016 (1983).
88. 681 F.2d at 519.
89. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519 (1983).
90. In Associated General Contractors,the plaintiffs were labor unions which asserted
that the defendant, a multiemployer association, had violated the antitrust laws by coercing
certain third parties to enter into business relationships with nonunion firms. The Court
held that the unions were not persons injured by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws
and thus lacked standing to sue. Id at 545-46.
91. H.S. Crocker Co. v. Ostrofe, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983).
92. Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 460 U.S. 1016 (1983).
93. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that Justice Blackmun filed a notation in
Bichan stating that he would have vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Associated General Contractors. Bichan%460 U.S. at 1016.
94. Associated GeneralContractors,459 U.S. at 536-37.
95. See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.), cert denied,
104 S. Ct. 393 (1983).
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may seem, an action "on the merits" that ordinarily would have been
quite ambiguous took on an unmistakable meaning only by reason of a
denial of review that ordinarily would have had no meaning at all.96
96. No meaning, that is, except that "fewer than four members of the Court thought
[certiorari] should be granted." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919
(1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). Cf. McDonald v.
Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370, 1374 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1983) (suggesting that the Associated
GeneralContractorstest "is further illuminated by the Supreme Court's actions" in vacating
judgments in Ostrofe and Mitsuibut denying review in Bichan, no mention of fact that lower
court in Mitsur after remand, adhered to prior decision), petitionfor cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W.
3792 (U.S. Apr. 10, 1984) (No. 83-1659).
While this Article was in the final stages of preparation, the Ninth Circuit issued its
opinion on remand in Ostrofe. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 740 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1984).
By a 2-1 vote, the court adhered to its previous decision. Rejecting the interpretation set
forth in the text above, the court asserted that "the Supreme Court meant us to reconsider
our decision in light of Associated GeneralContractorsand nothing more." Id at 748. The
court acknowledged "at least a superficial conflict [with the plenary decision] counseling
reexamination," but stated that "[h]ad the result of that reexamination been clear, the Court
would have simply reversed" rather than vacating and remanding. Id at 747-48. In a footnote, the court cited an earlier version of this Article as having "suggested that the Court has
abandoned the practice of issuing summary reversals in light of intervening precedent." Id
at 748 n.2 (citing Hellman, "Granted, Vacated, and Remanded-- Shedding Light on a Dark
Corner of Supreme Court Practice,67 JUDICATURE 389, 392 (1984)). The opinion continued:
"The Court itself, however, has announced no such change of policy. Even if cases that
previously would have been summarily reversed now are remanded, we could not conclude
that this is such a case. It would be all but impossible to distinguish between cases in which
only reconsideration was intended and those in which reversal was thought proper. Consequently, our duty is to read the intervening Supreme Court decision fairly and determine
whether it requires a different result." Id
As shown in Part II of this Article, the Ninth Circuit is correct in stating that a remand
for reconsideration is not tantamount to reversal. However, the court is on shakier ground
in arguing that the issuance of a remand order rather than a reversal means that the
Supreme Court could not have regarded Ostrofe I as plainly inconsistent with Associated
General Contractors. Strong evidence leaves no doubt that the Court issues reconsideration
orders in numerous cases where the lower court's judgment could not possibly have been
seen as harmonious with the new precedent. See supranotes 35-37 and accompanying text.
Indeed, the authority cited by the Ninth Circuit in support of its statement-R. STERN & E.
GRESSMAN, supranote 5, at 363 an. 30-32-actually undermines the proposition: although
the treatise was published in 1978, the authors list no cases after 1966 in which the Supreme
Court summarily reversed a judgment "clearly controlled by one or more of its own recent
decisions."
This analysis, of course, does not necessarily vitiate the Ninth Circuit's ultimate conclusion about the precedential effect of Associated GeneralContractorson Ostrofe; as the opinion states, the lower court's task after a GVR is "to read the intervening. . . decision fairly
and determine whether it requires a different result." See supranote 59 and accompanying
text. But in Ostrofe the plenary decision was not the only source of guidance for carrying
out that task. The defendant argued (as I have done in this Article) that whatever ambiguity
might have attached to the GVR if it had stood alone, the simultaneous denial of review in
Bichan gave a clear indication that the Supreme Court agreed with the position of the Seventh Circuit and disagreed with that of the Ninth.
The Ninth Circuit rejected this interpretation. Citing the brief in opposition to Bichan's
certiorari petition, the court argued that "[t]he more plausible explanation" for the denial of

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

IV.

[Vol. 11:5

The Justices' Dilemma

The wide spectrum of interpretations in the lower courts reflects,
in a way, the difficulties that these cases pose for the Supreme Court.

When a newly filed certiorari petition or jurisdictional stafement appears to raise an issue similar to one that is being accorded plenary
consideration, the Justices face something of a dilemma.
review in Bichan is that the Justices were not ready to resolve the intercircuit conflict over
the narrow issue of antitrust standing for the terminated employee. 740 F.2d at 748.
One difficulty with this analysis is that if the Court wished to allow the intercircuit
conflict to "percolate" further, see infra note 120, one would have expected the Justices to
deny certiorari in Ostrofeas well as Bichan. Thus, in the 1983 Term the Court denied review
in two cases reaching opposite results on an important and recurring question of en banc
procedure in the courts of appeals. CompareArnold v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 712 F.2d 899
(4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984), with Clark v. American Broadcasting
Companies, 684 F.2d 1208, 1226 (6th Cir. 1982) (vacating order granting rehearing en banc),
mandamus denied, 104 S. Ct. 538 (1983).
It is also striking that on the same day it denied certiorari in Bichan and vacated the
judgment in Ostrofe, the Court denied review in all of the cases-a total of eight-that had
been held to await the plenary decision in Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983). The
Court had granted certiorari in Johnson to resolve a conflict over the question whether a jury
instruction that violates the rule of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), can be
harmless error. Some of the held cases had found the Sandstrom error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Tweety v. Mitchell, 682 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied,460 U.S. 1013 (1983). Others had rejected a harmless error rationale. See, e.g., Mason v. Balkcom, 669 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), cert. denied,460 U.S. 1016 (1983). But
Johnson failed to resolve the issue because the Court divided equally. See Johnson, 460 U.S.
at 90 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Thus, when it was plain that the plenary decision could not
assist in the resolution of the common issue (and, presumably, when none of the held cases
appeared to be good vehicles for addressing the question), the Court was willing to allow the
conflict to continue. The failure to deny review in Ostrofe as well as Bichan suggests that on
the question of an employee's antitrust standing the Court did think the plenary decision
would prove dispositive.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Bichan order is also undercut by the nature
and scope of the plenary opinion in Associated General Contractors. As noted earlier, the
Court refers to "the infinite variety of claims that may arise," 459 U.S. at 536, and disavows
the possibility of a black letter rule that will decide all questions of antitrust standing.
Rather, the Court instructs lower courts to consider a variety of "factors that circumscribe
and guide the exercise ofjudgment in deciding whether the law affords a remedy in specific
circumstances." Id at 537. The opinion then undertakes a lengthy analysis of the various
factors as applied in the context of a labor union's suit against a multiemployer bargaining
association.
This approach--the description of the issue as well as the method of adjudicating the
particular case-casts doubt on the view that the Court had decided to leave for another day
the authoritative resolution of the question presented by Ostrofe and Bichan. The more
plausible inference is that the very thing the Court did not want to do was to take a series of
cases to decide, one at a time, "the infinite variety" of antitrust standing issues; rather, the
Court hoped, through the Associated General Contractorsopinion, to provide a framework
that would enable the lower courts to decide these issues without further Supreme Court
guidance. But on the question of antitrust standing for the terminated employee, the Court
did not need to rest on the plenary opinion alone. By vacating the judgment in Ostrofe and
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On the one hand, to grant plenary review would be to allocate a
scarce position on the plenary docket to a case that would probably add
little or nothing to the precedential guidance available from the case
already taken. A generation ago, that prospect might not have troubled
the Court; the Justices appear to have been somewhat more willing
than they are today to hear oral argument in several cases raising essentially the same issue.9 7 And the practice does have the advantage of
allowing the Court to consider the operation of a legal rule in a variety
of factual contexts. 98 But with the fierce competition for places on the

plenary docket today, the procedure is now more difficult to justify, and
the Court has largely abandoned it. 99
On the other hand, to allow the judgment in the later-fied case to

stand without regard to the impending plenary decision might be to
deprive at least one litigant of the benefit of a new rule of law solely by
reason of an accident of timing." °° While that outcome would engender little if any harm from the standpoint of the Court's role as

lawmaker, it arguably would be inconsistent with the obligation of
judges to do justice in the cases before them.' 0 ' Moreover, even after
the plenary decision has come down, extensive study may be required
denying review in Bichan, the Court-without the need for further plenary review--could
give a clear indication of how that particular kind of claim ought to be resolved. Compare
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (plenary decision
holding, on broad grounds, that the legislative veto is unconstitutional), with Process Gas
Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983) (summarily affirming decision striking down legislative veto in very different context).
97. See, e.g., First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S.
545 (1958); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Vance, 355 U.S. 389 (1958); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353
U.S. 692 (1957); United States v. Employing Lathers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 198 (1954).
98. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 856 n.325.
99. But see Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S. 453 (1980) (companion case to
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980)).
On occasion, the Court grants review in two cases arising out of separate proceedings
but involving related issues and consolidates them for oral argument. The Court is then able
to consider the operation of a legal rule in discrete factual contexts without giving up an
additional place on the plenary docket. The drawback is that the parties on one or both
sides have only 15 minutes in which to present their arguments. See, e.g., 51 U.S.L.W. 3789
(U.S. Apr. 25, 1983) (four counsel given one hour for argument in consolidated cases 812386 and 81-2408). And the procedure-which is rare to begin with-generally is invoked
only when the second case arrives at the Court closely on the heels of the first.
100. That is, if the case had moved more slowly through the lower courts, it would be
decided under the new rule without the need for Supreme Court intervention; if the case had
moved more quickly, it might have been the one selected for plenary review. See United
States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 556 n. 16 (1982) ("[p]otential for unequal treatment is inherent" in process of giving plenary consideration to only one of several pending cases raising
the same issue).
101. See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1976) (oath taken by federal judges); Desist v. United States,
394 U.S. 244, 255 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol 11:5

to determine which of several
possible dispositions is most appropriate
10 2
for the later-received case.
Given these constraints, it is understandable that the Justices
would adopt the practice of holding the new case until the plenary decision is announced' 0 3 and then, unless the judgment below seems clearly
in harmony with the new precedent, remanding for further consideration by the lower court. 104 The discussion in the preceding pages, however, suggests that the Court has created unnecessary problems both for
the lower courts and for itself by the overuse of the reconsideration
order. The point is further illustrated by juxtaposing the histories of
two cases in which GVR's were issued.
05 the petitioner asserted that the rescission
In Van Curen v. Jago,1
of his parole without a hearing violated the Due Process Clause. The
court of appeals denied relief, but the Supreme Court vacated its judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of an intervening deci10 6
sion that had addressed a related claim by Nebraska prisoners.
Upon remand (and after an intervening remand to the district court),
the court of appeals reversed its initial position and held that the prisoner's constitutional rights had indeed been violated. 0 7 Now it was the
warden who sought review in the Supreme Court. Again the Court
granted certiorari, and again it acted summarily, but this time the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed outright. Thus, after the case
had gone to the Supreme Court twice and to the court of appeals three
times, the warden prevailed, as he had done in the first court of appeals
102. The alternative dispositions include denial of review, remand for reconsideration,
summary disposition on the merits, or grant of plenary review.
103. A limited sampling suggests that the Court applies very liberal criteria in deciding
which new cases will be set aside. See infra note 127.
104. On at least one occasion, the Court failed to follow this practice in its handling of
two certiorari petitions raising virtually identical issues. In Washington Gas Light Co. v.
Thomas, 598 F.2d 617 (1979) (unpublished order), the Fourth Circuit reversed a workmen's
compensation award, relying on its earlier decision in Pettus v. American Airlines, 587 F.2d
627 (4th Cir. 1978). Petitions in both cases were pending before the Supreme Court as the
1979 Term opened. On the first day of the Term the Court denied review in Pettus, two
Justices dissented. 444 U.S. 883 (1979). A few weeks later the Court granted review in
Thomas, 444 U.S. 962 (1979), and, after argument, it reversed the judgment. 448 U.S. 261
(1980). The Solicitor General had urged the Court to grant review in Pettus and hold
Thomas pending its disposition. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 4, Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980). The probable explanation for the Court's seemingly
anomalous treatment of the two cases is that the Justices decided that the Pettus petition was
not timely filed.
105. 578 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1978) (order denying preliminary injunction), vacated,442
U.S. 926 (1979).
106. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
107. Van Curen v. Jago, 641 F.2d 411 (6th Cir.), rev'd, 454 U.S. 14 (1981).
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decision. And the judges of the Sixth Circuit were left to wonder why
their efforts to apply the governing principles came closer to the mark
when they did not have the benefit of the intervening decision than

when they did.'
0 9 was very
The sequence of events in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp"
different. The court of appeals initially held that an organization of

travel agents lacked standing to challenge a regulation issued by the
Comptroller of the Currency. The Supreme Court vacated that judgment" and remanded for reconsideration in light of an intervening

decision that had upheld the standing of data processing companies to
challenge a similar regulation. On remand, the court of appeals adhered to its prior determination, stating,
Clearly the Court did not feel that the mere fact that [the plaintiffs] were in competition with the defendant bank gave them
standing. Had it intended so substantial a change in the law it
would not only have written a quite different opinion in [the intervening decision]; it would have reversed us out of hand."'
108. A similar sense of frustration was no doubt felt by the judges of the Seventh Circuit
in the wake of two Supreme Court rulings in a habeas corpus case involving a state criminal
defendant's challenge to the admissibility of a confession. The court of appeals (having
previously remanded for an evidentiary hearing in the district court) initially held that the
defendant had waived his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation.
White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979) (White I). On the defendant's certiorari
petition, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light
of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), a plenary decision that took a narrow view of
the circumstances in which an accused can validly waive his Fifth Amendment right to
counsel. White v. Finkbeiner, 451 U.S. 1013 (1981). The Seventh Circuit, concluding that
"[tihe facts of this case are almost identical to those of Edwards," held that the confession
was inadmissible. White v. Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 1982) (White 111). Nothing in the Seventh Circuit's opinion suggests that either the prosecutor or the court thought it
relevant that White's conviction had become final in 1976, five years before Edwards was
announced. See White II, 611 F.2d at 188.
The state then filed a certiorari petition arguing that the court of appeals had misapplied Edwards and that the rationale of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), should be
extended to bar federal habeas corpus in Fifth Amendment cases like White's. No issue of
retroactivity was raised. However, a year later, with the petition in White still pending, the
Supreme Court granted review in another habeas case in which the state argued that Edwardsshould not be given retroactive effect. After oral argument, the Court agreed with the
state's contention and held that Edwardswas "not to be applied in collateral review of final
convictions." Solem v. Stumes, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1345 (1984). The Court then remanded
White for reconsideration in light of the holding of nonretroactivity. Fairman v. White, 104
S. Ct. 1433 (1984). Thus, three years after being told to reconsider White in light of Edwards,
the Seventh Circuit was instructed to decide the case under pre-Edwardsprinciples-pres-umably the same ones that the court applied in its initial decision. See infra notes 117-125
and accompanying text.
109. 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), vacated,397 U.S. 315 (1970).
110. Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 315 (1970).
111. Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 428 F.2d 359, 361 (1st Cir. 1970).
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Certiorari was again sought, and this time the Supreme Court did reverse "out of hand"- t e., summarily-in a brief opinion relying on the
intervening decision cited in the earlier order." 2
It is true that at the time the court of appeals was deciding the case
on remand, the Supreme Court had not abandoned the practice of re-

versing summarily and without opinion on the authority of an intervening precedent. Nevertheless, as the Van Curen case demonstrates,
the Court's use of the GVR continues to cause confusion in the lower

courts, uncertainty among lawyers, and delay for litigants. Nothing
will eliminate the problems completely, but four changes in the way the
Court handles these cases might put an end to at least some of the

ambiguities inherent in the present practice.
First, the Court might distinguish between cases that merely war-

rant reconsideration and those that are doomed to reversal, limiting
113

remand orders to the former and reversing outright in the latter.
This approach would leave no doubt of the tentative nature of the reconsideration orders, without precluding the lower courts in any of the
cases from addressing issues not governed by the intervening
decision. 14
Second, when the court below has itself remanded for further proceedings, it will sometimes make sense for the Supreme Court to deny
review rather than issue its own remand order, even when the lower
court's judgment rests on a rule of law repudiated by the intervening
112. Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970) (per curiam).
113. I have criticized the practice of reversing summarily without opinion, see Hellman,
supra note 1, at 824, but I think that reversal on the authority of an intervening decision is
justified as long as the new precedent indisputably vitiates the judgment brought for review.
See Comment, Per Cur/am Decisionsof the Supreme Court: 1957 Term, 26 U. CHI. L. REv.
279, 285 (1959). See also infra note 126 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 n.18 (1979); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l
Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168 (1939) ("While a mandate is controlling as to matters within its
compass, on the remand a lower court is free as to other issues."). Of course, there may be
some difficulty in determining what matters are "within [the] compass" of a reversal that
simply cites one or two cases, but the Supreme Court could make clear that such dispositions
are to be construed as narrowly as dismissals for want of a substantial federal question. Cf.
Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (precedential effect of summary dismissals limited to "precise issues presented and necessarily decided"). The lower courts would thus
have as much leeway in considering other issues as they would if the dispositions were in the
form of remands for reconsideration. Nor would this approach replicate the confusion engendered today by the Court's summary dismissals. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 817. For
one thing, a reversal is less likely to be ambiguous than an affirmance. More important, the
Court would cite the cases that require the overturning of the decision below; in contrast,
summary dismissals ordinarily are issued with no explanation whatever.
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decision." 5 After all, if the decision is relevant, the trial court presumably will6 take account of it whether or not a higher tribunal directs it to
do so."1

Third, the Court should confront and clarify the relationship between reconsideration orders and the doctrines of retroactivity.1 7 This
115. This practice would merit consideration in any case where the judgment below contemplated further proceedings, even if it was final on the issue presented for review. About
25% of the cases in the remand study were nonfinal in this sense. See, e.g., Leigh v. McGuire, 613 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1979) (reversing district court's ruling that action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 was time-barred; holding that as a matter of federal law, the statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of related state court proceedings; remanding case to
district court), vacated, 446 U.S. 962 (1980) (for reconsideration in light of intervening
Supreme Court decision holding that state rules of tolling apply to § 1983 actions), on remand, 507 F. Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding, after second remand from court of appeals, that statute of limitations was not tolled and action was time-barred); General
Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1978) (vacating district court's judgment and suggesting that district court remand case to agency), vacated,441 U.S. 919 (1979),
on remand,607 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1979) (instructing district court to remand case to agency);
Lokey v. Richardson, 527 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1975) (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment), vacated, 427 U.S. 902 (1976), on remand, 600 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1979)
(reversing district court's dismissal of complaint), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 884 (1980). Among
more recent cases, see Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1981) (remanding case for new
trial), vacated, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982), on remand,691 F.2d 634 (1982) (remanding case for
new trial in light of Supreme Court decision as well as prior court of appeals decision).
Of course, the approach suggested in the text would work only as long as it remains
clear that the denial of certiorari imports no view of the merits. See supranotes 64, 72, & 96.
It would be particularly important to emphasize that the nonfinal nature of the judgment
below may itself be a good reason for denying review. See, e.g., Huch v. United States, 439
U.S. 1007 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); compare City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 449 U.S. 934 (1980) (denying certiorari, over three dissents, to court of
appeals decision that reversed district court's judgment for defendants and remanded for
further proceedings), with City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983) (on plenary
review, reversing court of appeals decision affirming grant of preliminary injunction; Court
based judgment on same issue previously denied review).
In at least one case, the court of appeals whose judgment was vacated had itself suggested that the district court defer further proceedings on remand until the Supreme Court
decided the two cases that ultimately provided the basis for the Supreme Court's remand
order. The cases were then awaiting argument in the Supreme Court. See Benfield v.
Bounds, 540 F.2d 670, 675 (4th Cir. 1976), vacatedsub nom. Jones v. Carroll, 429 U.S. 1033
(1977).
116. Although there is some authority to the contrary, see, e.g., Crane Co. v. American
Standard, Inc., 603 F.2d 244, 248 (2d Cir. 1979), the more sensible view is that a lower court
is not bound to follow the mandate of an appellate court if the mandate rests on a rule of law
repudiated by higher authority after the appellate court's decision. See, e.g., Delano v.
Kitch, 663 F.2d 990, 996 (10th Cir. 1981); Page v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 349 F.2d
820, 821 (5th Cir. 1965); Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 945, 949
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing cases), rev'd 603 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1979). Certainly the Supreme
Court could make clear, in an appropriate case, that it takes the latter position.
117. Compare United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166, 1173 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978) ("If the
Supreme Court had not intended [the decision cited in the GVR] to be applied retroactively,
there would have been no reason for remanding the case to this Court."), with United States
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does not mean that the Court must invariably decide, immediately
upon handing down a plenary decision, whether and to what extent the

decision will be given retroactive effect."' 8 That question may be difficult and divisive,1 19 and the Court may want more time to think about
it and to obtain the views of the lower courts. 120 Nor need the Court
establish a single rule governing all GVR's. Rather, what is needed is a
set of guidelines that will tell the lower courts whether or not retroac-

tivity is an issue requiring consideration. In particular, as long as the
Court takes the position, as apparently it does, that an unadorned GVR
embodies no view on the matter of retroactivity,12 1 the Court should
say so.' 2 2 The courts to which the orders are directed would then know
v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236, 252 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,444 U.S. 991 (1979), discussed supra
note 61. Cf.Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 821 (1969) (White, J., dissenting from summary reversal) ("I fear 4hat the summary dispositions in these cases [two summary reversals
and five denials of review in cases held pending the decision in Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969)], which strain so hard to avoid deciding the retroactivity of Chimel,will only
magnify the confusion...").
118. The Court, however, may choose to do so. See infra note 124.
119. See, e.g., Solem v. Stumes, 104 S.Ct. 1338 (1984) (6-3 decision rejecting retroactive
application of decision on Fifth Amendment right to counsel); United States v. Johnson, 457
U.S. 537 (1982) (5-4 decision upholding retroactive application of Fourth Amendment
decision).
120. See Hellman, Caseload,Conflicts, and DecisionalCapacity: Does the Supreme Court
Need Help? 67 JUDICATURE 28, 37 (1983) (benefits of "percolation").
121. That this is the Court's position may be inferred from the decision in Solem v.
Stumes, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1345 (1984), in which the Court held that the rule of Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), should "not... be applied in collateral review of final convictions." See supra note 108. Neither the majority nor the dissent made any mention of the
fact that immediately following the decision in Edwards, the Court had directed the Seventh
Circuit to reconsider, in light of that holding, a habeas corpus case in which the avenues of
direct review had long since been exhausted. See White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 186 (7th
Cir. 1979), vacated, 451 U.S. 1013 (1981), discussed supra note 108. In contrast, when a
plenary decision repudiates a proposition apparently established by summary affirmances,
the Court usually makes some mention of those decisions. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 498-500 (1981) (noting limited precedential value of summary affirmances).
The analysis in the text is also supported by the fact that when the Court decided to give
retroactive effect to the Fourth Amendment holding of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980), the majority noted, but did not rely on, the reconsideration orders issued in the wake
of Payton. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 556 n.16 (1982).
122. A case now before the Court appears to present an excellent vehicle for clarifying
the law on this point. In State v. Shea, 421 So. 2d 200, 210 (La. 1982), cert. granted, 104 S.
Ct. 2167 (1984), the state court held that Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), was not to
be applied retroactively to a defendant whose conviction was on direct appeal at the time
Edwards was announced. The court acknowledged that "[s]hortly after Edwards was decided, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a number of cases which were apparently
pending on direct review in that Court, vacated the judgments and remanded for further
consideration in light of Edwards." 421 So. 2d at 210 n.7. Nevertheless, the majority insisted, without further elaboration, that "[t]his action does not mean that the Supreme Court
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that if an issue of nonretroactivity plausibly can be raised, that issue
should be addressed and decided before the vacated judgment is reversed on the authority of the intervening decision. 23 On the other
hand, in those instances where the Court is ready to resolve the retroacretivity issue without delay, 24 it should announce its decision and
25
mand only those cases that fall within the scope of the holding.
Finally, in questionable cases the Court might ask the litigants to
submit memoranda discussing the import of the intervening decision
and recommending an appropriate disposition. If the parties' responses
persuade the Court that the new precedent has no bearing on the laterfiled case, the Justices could deny review without any concern that an
injustice was being done. Or, if the case is certworthy in its own right,
they could grant review immediately. In either situation, the suggested
procedure would help to minimize the number of separate decisions
will ultimately decide to give full retroactive effect to Edwards." Id The dissent argued that
the reconsideration orders "clearly indicate that Edwards is not to be applied prospectively
only." Id at 212 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
123. Unfortunately, because of the ever-changing contours of the retroactivity doctrines,
it will not always be easy to ascertain whether a nonretroactivity argument is within the
realm of plausibility. For example, seven cases were remanded for reconsideration in light
of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), see supra note 122; in none of them did the
lower courts, on remand, so much as mention the possibility that Edwards might not be
applied retroactively. See also People v. Paintman, 412 Mich. 518, 531, 315 N.W.2d 418,
422-23 ("[I]t is unnecessary to analyze the question of retroactivity under traditional standards" because Edwardsdid not announce new law), cert.denied,456 U.S. 995 (1982). Nevertheless, the issue is very much an open one. See supranotes 121-22. The task of the lower
courts is also made more difficult by the Supreme Court's apparent view that courts may be
required to address questions of retroactivity even when not raised by the parties. See supra
note 108.
As a matter of logic, retroactivity might be regarded as a threshold issue; however, it
need not be so in practice. Thus, if the lower court, on remand, finds that the intervening
decision can readily be distinguished on some other ground, it may be able to avoid a difficult retroactivity question. Cf.Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971) (holding that
case does not come within rule established by earlier decision; pretermitting question of
retroactivity of that decision).
124. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 n.22 (1968) (announcing rule on
retroactivity simultaneously with plenary decision); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719
(1966) (announcing rule on retroactivity one week after plenary decision).
125. Thus, if the Court had been prepared to apply Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(198 1), to cases pending on direct appeal but not in collateral review of final convictions, it
would have denied certiorari in White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated,
451 U.S. 1013 (1981), and vacated the judgments only in the six state court cases that were
then before it.
If the Court wishes to change its current policy, it could announce that a remand for
reconsideration does embody a holding in favor of retroactivity unless the order explicitly
directs the lower court to address the issue. Of course, under such a regime the holding on
retroactivity would be limited to the procedural posture of the particular case.
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And if, after reviewing

the parties' submissions, the Court chooses to issue a reconsideration
order, the litigants and the lower court could be confident that the di-

rective meant just what it said.
Conclusion
In retrospect, it becomes apparent that the proper subject of inquiry is not the reconsideration order as such, but rather the Court's
handling of cases that have been set aside because they appear to involve an issue similar to one slated for plenary adjudication. 27 This
study shows that once the plenary decision is handed down, the Court
reexamines the held cases. If the Court determines that the lower
court's ruling is consistent with the intervening decision, it will simply
126. Sometimes the Supreme Court would benefit from hearing the views of the court
below on the effect of the intervening precedent, but this will not always be true, especially
where the issue does not depend on particular facts or where the question has been thoroughly ventilated in other courts. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 454 U.S. 891 (1981),
granting cert. to 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (agreeing to review decision rendered before
issuance of arguably dispositive Supreme Court ruling; asking parties to brief question
whether that ruling should be reconsidered). Cf. Shea v. Louisiana, 104 S. Ct. 2167 (1984),
grantingcert. to 421 So. 2d 200 (La. 1982) (agreeing to review case apparently held to await
decision in Solem v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338 (1984), discussed supra notes 108 & 121).
127. Of course, the Court's initial decision to hold a case rather than dispose of it immediately also involves an exercise of judgment. See, e.g., Borman's, Inc. v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 263, denying cert. to706 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1983) (denying review in case
that presented issue superficially similar to one under consideration in NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 459 U.S. 1145 (1983), granting cert. to In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982)).
Complete analysis of the process by which those determinations are made is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, for whatever the information is worth, Borman's is one of
only two cases of its kind that I was able to identify on the first three order lists of the 1983
Term. (The other case is Case v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 94, denying cert. to United States
v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1983) (presenting issue similar to one scheduled for adjudication in Oliver v. United States, 459 U.S. 1168 (1983), grantingcert. to 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir.
1982)); see Iensel,699 F.2d at 31-33.) Earlier I had flagged more than 20 certiorari petitions
as likely to be set aside pending the decision of an argued case; as of October 30, 1983, all of
the others remained on the Court's docket without action having been taken.
While I would not want to draw conclusions from this casual survey, it may well be that
the initial determination to hold a case is made with a bare minimum of study, and that all
cases "even. . . remotely involving" issues scheduled for plenary consideration, see supra
note 21 and accompanying text, ordinarily are set aside. Certainly that approach would
make a good deal of sense. The relevance of the plenary decision win often depend on
how-and how broadly--the Court resolves the various issues presented. At the time the
new case is filed, there may be no way of knowing what the result of the plenary decision
will be, or which of several possible grounds ultimately will command a majority.
The Court must make a similar determination whenever a prisoner under sentence of
death seeks a stay of execution pending the decision of a plenary case raising allegedly
similar issues. Compare Autry v. Estelle, 104 S. Ct. 24 (White, Circuit Justice, 1983) (granting stay), with Maggio v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 311 (1983) (per curiam) (denying stay).
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deny certiorari. But if there is even a surface inconsistency between the
holding below and the new precedent, the Court will generally remand
for reconsideration by the lower court.
Seen in this light, the process begins to look very much like a species of review for error. Although denial of review is not, in theory, an
affirmance, and a remand for reconsideration is not tantamount to reversal, the determination to invoke one mode of disposition rather than
the other is governed by the same basic criterion that underlies the exercise of review for error: the correctness of the judgment below-here
judged by reference to the intervening Supreme Court decision.
At first blush, it may seem anomalous to find the United States
Supreme Court engaging in something akin to review for error, and on
a rather large scale at that: more than 100 cases in the 1981 Term
alone, if we count (as we must) all held cases, whether the ultimate
disposition be one of remand or denial of review. 128 In recent years
there has been widespread agreement that review for error should play
at best a minor part in the Court's work, and that the Court should
consider, in the words of the Justices, only cases "of. . .general public
importance or concern."' 12 9 By the same token, analysis of the Court's
docket has focused primarily on the Court's role as the final expositor
of the national law. 13 0
It does not follow, however, that the GVR practice is an anomaly,
much less that it is a dispensable vestige of an earlier era. The question
is put into sharp focus by Justice Stevens' recent proposal for a new
court that would screen all applications for Supreme Court review and
31
deny all but the very few that clearly warrant the Court's attention.'
Justice Stevens assumes, quite plausibly, that if the selection process
were vested in a separate tribunal, the Justices' docket would be limited
to questions "sufficiently important for decision on a national level,"
and would exclude cases that involve merely the possibility of error in
the court below.' 32 And it can be argued that the proposal does no
more than to take to its logical extreme the view of the Court's function
that has already been endorsed by all of the Justices.
128. The number of cases held for a pending decision and then denied review varies just
as greatly from Term to Term as the number in which remand orders are issued, and for the
same reasons. See supranotes 13-14 and accompanying text. Thus, in the 1980 Term there
were at least 60 held/denied cases, but in the following Term the number dropped to about
40.
129. Hellman, supranote 1, at 799-800 (quoting letter signed by all nine sitting Justices).
130. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 45.
131. Stevens, Some Thoughts on JudicialRestraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 182 (1982).
132. Id
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Suppose, then, that Justice Stevens' plan were to be adopted.
What would happen to the cases that are now set aside by the Justices
pending the announcement of a plenary decision? The new court could
of course deny review in all such cases, but for reasons given earlier
this would be unfair to at least some of the litigants.' 33 At the same
time, it is difficult to see how another tribunal could make the kinds of
judgments that the Supreme Court now makes in deciding which superficially similar cases should be remanded and which should not.
Yet even if the new court could somehow develop an understanding that would enable it to dispose of the potential GVR cases in a
manner that the Justices would find acceptable, that would not be the
end of the matter. These cases remind us that, notwithstanding its
unique role as the final expositor of the national law, the Supreme
Court remains a court-a tribunal that operates within the judicial system and derives its authority to announce legal rules from a grant of
jurisdiction over individual cases and controversies. For logistical and
other reasons, the Court will never be able to consider the merits of the
lower courts' judgments in any substantial proportion of the cases in
which review is sought. Nor, except in a sporadic way, can the Court
undertake the task of defining the contours of legal rules on a case-bycase basis in the tradition of the common law.' 34 But by holding cases
pending the announcement of a plenary decision and then remanding
for reconsideration or denying review, the Court gains an immediate
opportunity to consider the consequences and implications of its plenary opinions. And if after a remand a lower court adheres to its prior
ruling, the Justices are again forced to confront questions about the
meaning and scope of one of their precedents as applied in a particular
factual context.
From this perspective, it can be seen that the opportunity to determine which of the held cases should be remanded and which should be
denied review has an importance for the Court that goes beyond considerations of justice for the litigants or clarity in the national law. In
an imperfect and limited way, the GVR practice prevents the Court
from becoming, even more than it already is, a remote lawgiver largely
cut off from the traditional processes of common-law adjudication.
There is room for improvement in the way the practice is carried out,
but the Court would be ill-advised to abandon it altogether. This arrangement will not satisfy those who like neat demarcations in the allocation of responsibilities, but a certain untidiness is unavoidable when
133. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
134. See Hellman, supra note 45, at 630-33; HeUman, supra note 1, at 871.
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large scale national governance is superimposed on a legal system
deeply rooted in the common-law tradition.

